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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 92-344
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CHRIS SALE, ACTING COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRA-
TION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, et al.,
PETITIONERS v. HAITIAN CENTERS
COUNCIL, INC., et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the second circuit
[June 21, 1993]

  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
  The President has directed the Coast Guard to intercept
vessels illegally transporting passengers from Haiti to the
United States and to return those passengers to Haiti
without first determining whether they may qualify as
refugees.  The question presented in this case is whether
such forced repatriation, -authorized to be undertaken only
beyond the territorial sea of the United States,- violates
243(h)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA or Act).  We hold that neither 243(h) nor Article
33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees applies to action taken by the Coast Guard
on the high seas.
                      I
  Aliens residing illegally in the United States are subject
to deportation after a formal hearing.  Aliens arriving
at the border, or those who are temporarily paroled into
the country, are subject to an exclusion hearing, the less
formal process by which they, too, may eventually be
removed from the United States.  In either a deportation
or exclusion proceeding the alien may seek asylum as a
political refugee for whom removal to a particular country
may threaten his life or freedom.  Requests that the
Attorney General grant asylum or withhold deportation to
a particular country are typically, but not necessarily,
advanced as parallel claims in either a deportation or an
exclusion proceeding.  When an alien proves that he is
a -refugee,- the Attorney General has discretion to grant
him asylum pursuant to 208 of the Act.  If the proof
shows that it is more likely than not that the alien's life
or freedom would be threatened in a particular country
because of his political or religious beliefs, under 243(h)
the Attorney General must not send him to that country.
The INA offers these statutory protections only to aliens
who reside in or have arrived at the border of the United
States.  For 12 years, in one form or another, the interdic-
tion program challenged here has prevented Haitians such
as respondents from reaching our shores and invoking
those protections.
  On September 23, 1981, the United States and the
Republic of Haiti entered into an agreement authorizing
the United States Coast Guard to intercept vessels en-
gaged in the illegal transportation of undocumented aliens
to our shores.  While the parties agreed to prosecute
-illegal traffickers,- the Haitian Government also guaran-
teed that its repatriated citizens would not be punished
for their illegal departure.  The agreement also estab-
lished that the United States Government would not
return any passengers -whom the United States authori-
ties determine[d] to qualify for refugee status.-  App. 382.
  On September 29, 1981, President Reagan issued a
proclamation in which he characterized -the continuing
illegal migration by sea of large numbers of undocumented
aliens into the southeastern United States- as -a serious
national problem detrimental to the interests of the
United States.-  Presidential Proclamation No. 4865, 3
CFR 50-51 (1981-1983 Comp.).  He therefore suspended
the entry of undocumented aliens from the high seas and
ordered the Coast Guard to intercept vessels carrying such
aliens and to return them to their point of origin.  His
executive order expressly -provided, however, that no
person who is a refugee will be returned without his
consent.-  Executive Order 12324, 3 CFR 2(c)(3), p. 181
(1981-1983 Comp.).
  In the ensuing decade, the Coast Guard interdicted
approximately 25,000 Haitian migrants.  After inter-
views conducted on board Coast Guard cutters, aliens who
were identified as economic migrants were -screened out-
and promptly repatriated.  Those who made a credible
showing of political refugee status were -screened in- and
transported to the United States to file formal applications
for asylum.  App. 231.
  On September 30, 1991, a group of military leaders
displaced the government of Jean Bertrand Aristide, the
first democratically elected president in Haitian history.
As the District Court stated in an uncontested finding of
fact, since the military coup -hundreds of Haitians have
been killed, tortured, detained without a warrant, or
subjected to violence and the destruction of their property
because of their political beliefs.  Thousands have been
forced into hiding.-  App. to Pet. for Cert. 144a.  Follow-
ing the coup the Coast Guard suspended repatriations for
a period of several weeks, and the United States imposed
economic sanctions on Haiti.
  On November 18, 1991, the Coast Guard announced
that it would resume the program of interdiction and
forced repatriation.  The following day, the Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc., representing a class of interdicted
Haitians, filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida alleging that
the Government had failed to establish and implement
adequate procedures to protect Haitians who qualified for
asylum.  The District Court granted temporary relief that
precluded any repatriations until February 4, 1992, when
a reversal on appeal in the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit and a denial of certiorari by this Court
effectively terminated that litigation.  See Haitian Refugee
Center, Inc. v. Baker, 949 F. 2d 1109 (1991) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 502 U. S. ___ (1992).
  In the meantime the Haitian exodus expanded drama-
tically.  During the six months after October 1991, the
Coast Guard interdicted over 34,000 Haitians.  Because
so many interdicted Haitians could not be safely processed
on Coast Guard cutters, the Department of Defense
established temporary facilities at the United States Naval
Base in Guantanamo, Cuba, to accommodate them during
the screening process.  Those temporary facilities, how-
ever, had a capacity of only about 12,500 persons.  In the
first three weeks of May 1992, the Coast Guard inter-
cepted 127 vessels (many of which were considered
unseaworthy, overcrowded, and unsafe); those vessels
carried 10,497 undocumented aliens.  On May 22, 1992,
the United States Navy determined that no additional
migrants could safely be accommodated at Guantanamo.
App. 231-233.
  With both the facilities at Guantanamo and available
Coast Guard cutters saturated, and with the number of
Haitian emigrants in unseaworthy craft increasing (many
had drowned as they attempted the trip to Florida), the
Government could no longer both protect our borders and
offer the Haitians even a modified screening process.  It
had to choose between allowing Haitians into the United
States for the screening process or repatriating them
without giving them any opportunity to establish their
qualifications as refugees.  In the judgment of the Presi-
dent's advisors, the first choice not only would have
defeated the original purpose of the program (controlling
illegal immigration), but also would have impeded diplo-
matic efforts to restore democratic government in Haiti
and would have posed a life-threatening danger to thou-
sands of persons embarking on long voyages in dangerous
craft.  The second choice would have advanced those
policies but deprived the fleeing Haitians of any screening
process at a time when a significant minority of them
were being screened in.  See App. 66.
  On May 23, 1992, President Bush adopted the second
choice.  After assuming office, President Clinton decided
not to modify that order; it remains in effect today.  The
wisdom of the policy choices made by Presidents Reagan,
Bush, and Clinton is not a matter for our consideration.
We must decide only whether Executive Order No. 12807,
57 Fed. Reg. 23133 (1992), which reflects and implements
those choices, is consistent with 243(h) of the INA.

                     II
  Respondents filed this lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York on
March 18, 1992-before the promulgation of Executive
Order No. 12807.  The plaintiffs include organizations that
represent interdicted Haitians as well as Haitians who
were then being detained at Guantanamo.  They sued the
Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Commander of
the Guantanamo Naval Base, complaining that the screen-
ing procedures provided on Coast Guard cutters and at
Guantanamo did not adequately protect their statutory
and treaty rights to apply for refugee status and avoid
repatriation to Haiti.
  They alleged that the September 1991 coup had -trig-
gered a continuing widely publicized reign of terror in
Haiti-; that over 1,500 Haitians were believed to -have
been killed or subjected to violence and destruction of
their property because of their political beliefs and affilia-
tions-; and that thousands of Haitian refugees -have set
out in small boats that are often overloaded, unseaworthy,
lacking basic safety equipment, and operated by inexperi-
enced persons, braving the hazards of a prolonged journey
over high seas in search of safety and freedom.-  App. 24.
  In April, the District Court granted the plaintiffs a
preliminary injunction requiring defendants to give
Haitians on Guantanamo access to counsel for the screen-
ing process.  We stayed that order on April 22, 1992, 503
U. S. ___, and, while the defendants' appeal from it was
pending, the President issued the Executive Order now
under attack.  Plaintiffs then applied for a temporary
restraining order to enjoin implementation of the Execu-
tive Order.  They contended that it violated 243(h) of the
Act and Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees.  The District Court denied the
application because it concluded that 243(h) is -unavailable
as a source of relief for Haitian aliens in international
waters,- and that such a statutory provision was necessary
because the Protocol's provisions are not -self-executing.-
App. to Pet. for Cert. 166a-168a.
  The Court of Appeals reversed.  Haitian Centers Coun-
cil, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F. 2d 1350 (CA2 1992).  After
concluding that the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in
Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 953 F. 2d 1498
(1992), did not bar its consideration of the issue, the
Court held that 243(h)(1) does not apply only to aliens
within the United States.  The Court found its conclusion
mandated by both the broad definition of the term -alien-
in 101(a)(3) and the plain language of 243(h), from
which the 1980 amendment had removed the words
-within the United States.-  The Court reasoned that
the text of the statute defeated the Eleventh Circuit's
reliance on the placement of 243(h)(1) in Part V of the
INA (titled -Deportation; Adjustment of Status-) as
evidence that it applied only to aliens in the United
States.  Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the
Government's suggestion that since 243(h) restricted
actions of the Attorney General only, it did not limit the
President's power to order the Coast Guard to repatriate
undocumented aliens intercepted on the high seas.
  Nor did the Court of Appeals accept the Government's
reliance on Article 33 of the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees.  It recognized that
the 1980 amendment to the INA had been intended to
conform our statutory law to the provisions of the Conven-
tion, but it read Article 33.1's prohibition against re-
turn, like the statute's, -plainly- to cover -all refugees,
regardless of location.-  969 F. 2d, at 1362.  This reading
was supported by the -object and purpose- not only of that
Article but also of the Convention as a whole.  While
the Court of Appeals recognized that the negotiating
history of the Convention disclosed that the representa-
tives of at least six countries construed the Article
more narrowly, it thought that those views might have
represented a dissenting position and that, in any event,
it would -turn statutory construction on its head- to allow
ambiguous legislative history to outweigh the Convention's
plain text.  Id., at 1366.
  The Second Circuit's decision conflicted with the Elev-
enth Circuit's decision in Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker,
953 F. 2d 1498 (1992), and with the opinion expressed by
Judge Edwards in Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 257
U. S. App. D. C. 367, 410-414, 809 F. 2d 794, 837-841
(1987) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).  Because of the manifest importance of the issue,
we granted certiorari, 506 U. S. ___ (1992).

                     III
  Both parties argue that the plain language of 243(h)(1)
is dispositive.  It reads as follows:
-The Attorney General shall not deport or return any
alien (other than an alien described in section
1251(a)(4)(D) of this title) to a country if the Attorney
General determines that such alien's life or freedom
would be threatened in such country on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.-  8 U. S. C.
1253(h)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. IV).
Respondents emphasize the words -any alien- and -re-
turn-; neither term is limited to aliens within the United
States.  Respondents also contend that the 1980 amend-
ment deleting the words -within the United States- from
the prior text of 243(h), see n. 2, supra, obviously gave
the statute an extraterritorial effect.  This change, they
further argue, was required in order to conform the
statute to the text of Article 33.1 of the Convention, which
they find as unambiguous as the present statutory text.
  Petitioners' response is that a fair reading of the INA
as a whole demonstrates that 243(h) does not apply to
actions taken by the President or Coast Guard outside the
United States; that the legislative history of the 1980
amendment supports their reading; and that both the text
and the negotiating history of Article 33 of the Convention
indicate that it was not intended to have any extraterri-
torial effect.

  We shall first review the text and structure of the
statute and its 1980 amendment, and then consider the
text and negotiating history of the Convention.

A.  The Text and Structure of the INA

  Although 243(h)(1) refers only to the Attorney General,
the Court of Appeals found it -difficult to believe that the
proscription of 243(h)(1)-returning an alien to his
persecutors-was forbidden if done by the attorney general
but permitted if done by some other arm of the executive
branch.-  969 F. 2d, at 1360.  Congress -understood- that
the Attorney General is the -President's agent for dealing
with immigration matters,- and would intend any refer-
ence to her to restrict similar actions of any government
official.  Ibid.  As evidence of this understanding, the
court cited 8 U. S. C. 1103(a).  That section, however,
conveys to us a different message.  It provides, in part:
     -The Attorney General shall be charged with the
administration and enforcement of this chapter and
all other laws relating to the immigration and natu-
ralization of aliens, except insofar as this chapter or
such laws relate to the powers, functions, and duties
conferred upon the President, the Secretary of State,
the officers of the Department of State, or diplomatic
or consular officers . . . .- (Emphasis added.)
  Other provisions of the Act expressly confer certain
responsibilities on the Secretary of State, the Presi-
dent, and, indeed, on certain other officers as well.
The 1981 and 1992 Executive Orders expressly relied on
statutory provisions that confer authority on the President
to suspend the entry of -any class of aliens- or to -impose
on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be
appropriate.-  We cannot say that the interdiction
program created by the President, which the Coast Guard
was ordered to enforce, usurped authority that Congress
had delegated to, or implicated responsibilities that it had
imposed on, the Attorney General alone.
  The reference to the Attorney General in the statutory
text is significant not only because that term cannot
reasonably be construed to describe either the President
or the Coast Guard, but also because it suggests that it
applies only to the Attorney General's normal responsibili-
ties under the INA.  The most relevant of those responsi-
bilities for our purposes are her conduct of the deportation
and exclusion hearings in which requests for asylum or
for withholding of deportation under 243(h) are ordinar-
ily advanced.  Since there is no provision in the statute
for the conduct of such proceedings outside the United
States, and since Part V and other provisions of the
INA obviously contemplate that such proceedings would
be held in the country, we cannot reasonably construe
243(h) to limit the Attorney General's actions in geo-
graphic areas where she has not been authorized to
conduct such proceedings.  Part V of the INA contains no
reference to a possible extraterritorial application.
  Even if Part V of the Act were not limited to strictly
domestic procedures, the presumption that Acts of Con-
gress do not ordinarily apply outside our borders would
support an interpretation of 243(h) as applying only
within United States territory.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabi-
an American Oil Co., 499 U. S. ___ (1991) (quoting Foley
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U. S. 281, 285 (1949)); Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. ___, ___-___, and n. 4
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); see also
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488
U. S. 428, 440 (1989) (-When it desires to do so, Congress
knows how to place the high seas within the jurisdictional
reach of a statute-).  The Court of Appeals held that the
presumption against extraterritoriality had -no relevance
in the present context- because there was no risk that
243(h), which can be enforced only in United States
courts against the United States Attorney General, would
conflict with the laws of other nations.  969 F. 2d, at
1358.  We have recently held, however, that the presump-
tion has a foundation broader than the desire to avoid
conflict with the laws of other nations.  Smith v. United
States, 507 U. S. ___, n. 5 (1993) (slip op., at 7).
  Respondents' expansive interpretation of the word
-return- raises another problem: it would make the word
-deport- redundant.  If -return- referred solely to the
destination to which the alien is to be removed, it alone
would have been sufficient to encompass aliens involved
in both deportation and exclusion proceedings.  And if
Congress had meant to refer to all aliens who might be
sent back to potential oppressors, regardless of their
location, the word -deport- would have been unnecessary.
By using both words, the statute implies an exclusively
territorial application, in the context of both kinds of
domestic immigration proceedings.  The use of both words
reflects the traditional division between the two kinds of
aliens and the two kinds of hearings.  We can reasonably
conclude that Congress used the two words -deport or
return- only to make 243(h)'s protection available in both
deportation and exclusion proceedings.  Indeed, the history
of the 1980 amendment confirms that conclusion.

B.  The History of the Refugee Act of 1980

  As enacted in 1952, 243(h) authorized the Attorney
General to withhold deportation of aliens -within the
United States.-  Six years later we considered the
question whether it applied to an alien who had been
paroled into the country while her admissibility was being
determined.  We held that even though she was physically
present within our borders, she was not -within the
United States- as those words were used in 243(h).
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U. S. 185, 186 (1958).
We explained the important distinction between -deporta-
tion- or -expulsion,- on the one hand, and -exclusion,- on
the other:
     -It is important to note at the outset that our
immigration laws have long made a distinction be-
tween those aliens who have come to our shores
seeking admission, such as petitioner, and those who
are within the United States after an entry, irrespec-
tive of its legality.  In the latter instance the Court
has recognized additional rights and privileges not
extended to those in the former category who are
merely `on the threshold of initial entry.'  Shaugh-
nessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206,
212 (1953).  See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344
U. S. 590, 596 (1953).  The distinction was carefully
preserved in Title II of the Immigration and National-
ity Act.-  Id., at 187.
Under the INA, both then and now, those seeking -admis-
sion- and trying to avoid -exclusion- were already within
our territory (or at its border), but the law treated them
as though they had never entered the United States at
all; they were within United States territory but not
-within the United States.-  Those who had been admitted
(or found their way in) but sought to avoid -expulsion-
had the added benefit of -deportation proceedings-; they
were both within United States territory and -within the
United States.-  Ibid.  Although the phrase -within
the United States- presumed the alien's actual presence
in the United States, it had more to do with an alien's
legal status than with his location.
  The 1980 amendment erased the long-maintained
distinction between deportable and excludable aliens for
purposes of 243(h).  By adding the word -return- and
removing the words -within the United States- from
243(h), Congress extended the statute's protection to both
types of aliens, but it did nothing to change the presump-
tion that both types of aliens would continue to be found
only within United States territory.  The removal of the
phrase -within the United States- cured the most obvious
drawback of 243(h): as interpreted in Leng May Ma, its
protection was available only to aliens subject to deporta-
tion proceedings.
  Of course, in addition to this most obvious purpose, it
is possible that the 1980 amendment also removed any
territorial limitation of the statute, and Congress might
have intended a double-barreled result.  That possibility,
however, is not a substitute for the affirmative evidence
of intended extraterritorial application that our cases
require.  Moreover, in our review of the history of the
amendment, we have found no support whatsoever for
that latter, alternative, purpose.
  The addition of the phrase -or return- and the deletion
of the phrase -within the United States- are the only
relevant changes made by the 1980 amendment to
243(h)(1), and they are fully explained by the intent to
apply 243(h) to exclusion as well as to deportation
proceedings.  That intent is plainly identified in the
legislative history of the amendment.  There is no
change in the 1980 amendment, however, that could only
be explained by an assumption that Congress also intended
to provide for the statute's extraterritorial application.
It would have been extraordinary for Congress to make
such an important change in the law without any mention
of that possible effect.  Not a scintilla of evidence of such
an intent can be found in the legislative history.
  In sum, all available evidence about the meaning of
243(h)-the government official at whom it is directed,
its location in the Act, its failure to suggest any extrater-
ritorial application, the 1980 amendment that gave it a
dual reference to -deport or return,- and the relevance of
that dual structure to immigration law in general-leads
unerringly to the conclusion that it applies in only one
context: the domestic procedures by which the Attorney
General determines whether deportable and excludable
aliens may remain in the United States.

                     IV
  Although the protection afforded by 243(h) did not
apply in exclusion proceedings before 1980, other provi-
sions of the Act did authorize relief for aliens at the
border seeking protection as refugees in the United States.
See INS v. Stevic, 467 U. S., at 415-416.  When the
United States acceded to the Protocol in 1968, therefore,
the INA already offered some protection to both classes of
refugees.  It offered no such protection to any alien who
was beyond the territorial waters of the United States,
though, and we would not expect the Government to
assume a burden as to those aliens without some acknowl-
edgment of its dramatically broadened scope.  Both
Congress and the Executive Branch gave extensive consid-
eration to the Protocol before ratifying it in 1968; in all
of their published consideration of it there appears no
mention of the possibility that the United States was
assuming any extraterritorial obligations.  Nevertheless,
because the history of the 1980 Act does disclose a general
intent to conform our law to Article 33 of the Convention,
it might be argued that the extraterritorial obligations
imposed by Article 33 were so clear that Congress, in
acceding to the Protocol, and then in amending the statute
to harmonize the two, meant to give the latter a corre-
spondingly extraterritorial effect.  Or, just as the statute
might have imposed an extraterritorial obligation that the
Convention does not (the argument we have just rejected),
the Convention might have established an extraterritorial
obligation which the statute does not; under the Suprem-
acy Clause, that broader treaty obligation might then
provide the controlling rule of law.  With those possibil-
ities in mind we shall consider both the text and negotiat-
ing history of the Convention itself.
  Like the text and the history of 243(h), the text and
negotiating history of Article 33 of the United Nations
Convention are both completely silent with respect to the
Article's possible application to actions taken by a country
outside its own borders.  Respondents argue that the
Protocol's broad remedial goals require that a nation be
prevented from repatriating refugees to their potential
oppressors whether or not the refugees are within that
nation's borders.  In spite of the moral weight of that
argument, both the text and negotiating history of Article
33 affirmatively indicate that it was not intended to have
extraterritorial effect.

A.  The Text of the Convention

            Two aspects of Article 33's text are persuasive.  The
first is the explicit reference in Article 33.2 to the country
in which the alien is located; the second is the parallel
use of the terms -expel or return,- the latter term ex-
plained by the French word -refouler.-
            The full text of Article 33 reads as follows:
                    -Article 33.-Prohibition of expulsion or return
(`refoulement')
   -1. No Contracting State shall expel or return
(`refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion.
   -2. The benefit of the present provision may not,
however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the
security of the country in which he is, or who, having
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community
of that country.-  Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U. S. T. 6259, 6276,
T. I. A. S. No. 6577 (emphasis added).
            Under the second paragraph of Article 33 an alien may
not claim the benefit of the first paragraph if he poses a
danger to the country in which he is located.  If the first
paragraph did apply on the high seas, no nation could
invoke the second paragraph's exception with respect to
an alien there: an alien intercepted on the high seas is
in no country at all.  If Article 33.1 applied extra-
territorially, therefore, Article 33.2 would create an absurd
anomaly: dangerous aliens on the high seas would be
entitled to the benefits of 33.1 while those residing in the
country that sought to expel them would not.  It is more
reasonable to assume that the coverage of 33.2 was
limited to those already in the country because it was
understood that 33.1 obligated the signatory state only
with respect to aliens within its territory.
            Article 33.1 uses the words -expel or return (`refouler')-
as an obvious parallel to the words -deport or return- in
243(h)(1).  There is no dispute that -expel- has the same
meaning as -deport-; it refers to the deportation or
expulsion of an alien who is already present in the host
country.  The dual reference identified and explained in
our opinion in Leng May Ma v. Barber, suggests that the
term -return (`refouler')- refers to the exclusion of aliens
who are merely -`on the threshold of initial entry.'-  357
U. S., at 187 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 212 (1953)).
            This suggestion-that -return- has a legal meaning
narrower than its common meaning-is reinforced by the
parenthetical reference to -refouler-, a French word that
is not an exact synonym for the English word -return.-
Indeed, neither of two respected English-French Diction-
aries mentions -refouler- as one of many possible French
translations of -return.-  Conversely, the English trans-
lations of -refouler- do not include the word -return.-
They do, however, include words like -repulse,- -repel,-
-drive back,- and even -expel.-  To the extent that they
are relevant, these translations imply that -return- means
a defensive act of resistance or exclusion at a border
rather than an act of transporting someone to a particular
destination.  In the context of the Convention, to -return-
means to -repulse- rather than to -reinstate.-
            The text of Article 33 thus fits with Judge Edwards'
understanding -that `expulsion' would refer to a `refugee
already admitted into a country' and that `return' would
refer to a `refugee already within the territory but not yet
resident there.'  Thus, the Protocol was not intended to
govern parties' conduct outside of their national borders.-
Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 257 U. S. App. D. C.,
at 413, 809 F. 2d, at 840 (footnotes omitted).  From the
time of the Convention, commentators have consistently
agreed with this view.
            The drafters of the Convention and the parties to the
Protocol-like the drafters of 243(h)-may not have
contemplated that any nation would gather fleeing refu-
gees and return them to the one country they had desper-
ately sought to escape; such actions may even violate the
spirit of Article 33; but a treaty cannot impose uncontem-
plated extraterritorial obligations on those who ratify it
through no more than its general humanitarian intent.
Because the text of Article 33 cannot reasonably be read
to say anything at all about a nation's actions toward
aliens outside its own territory, it does not prohibit such
actions.

B.  The Negotiating History of the Convention

            In early drafts of the Convention, what finally emerged
as Article 33 was numbered 28.  At a negotiating confer-
ence of plenipotentiaries held in Geneva, Switzerland on
July 11, 1951, the Swiss delegate explained his under-
standing that the words -expel- and -return- covered only
refugees who had entered the host country.  He stated:
                 -Mr. ZUTTER (Switzerland) said that the Swiss
Federal Government saw no reason why article 28
should not be adopted as it stood; for the article was
a necessary one.  He thought, however, that its
wording left room for various interpretations, particu-
larly as to the meaning to be attached to the words
`expel' and `return'.  In the Swiss Government's view,
the term -expulsion- applied to a refugee who had
already been admitted to the territory of a country.
The term `refoulement', on the other hand, had a
vaguer meaning; it could not, however, be applied to
a refugee who had not yet entered the territory of a
country.  The word `return', used in the English text,
gave that idea exactly.  Yet article 28 implied the
existence of two categories of refugee:  refugees who
were liable to be expelled, and those who were liable
to be returned.  In any case, the States represented
at the Conference should take a definite position with
regard to the meaning to be attached to the word
`return'.  The Swiss Government considered that in
the present instance the word applied solely to refu-
gees who had already entered a country, but were not
yet resident there.  According to that interpretation,
States were not compelled to allow large groups of
persons claiming refugee status to cross its frontiers.
He would be glad to know whether the States repre-
sented at the Conference accepted his interpretations
of the two terms in question.  If they did, Switzerland
would be willing to accept article 28, which was one
of the articles in respect of which States could not,
under article 36 of the draft Convention, enter a
reservation.- (Emphases added.)
            No one expressed disagreement with the position of the
Swiss delegate on that day or at the session two weeks
later when Article 28 was again discussed.  At that
session, the delegate of the Netherlands recalled the Swiss
delegate's earlier position:
                 -Baron van BOETZELAER (Netherlands) recalled
that at the first reading the Swiss representative had
expressed the opinion that the word `expulsion' related
to a refugee already admitted into a country, whereas
the word `return' (`refoulement') related to a refugee
already within the territory but not yet resident there.
According to that interpretation, article 28 would not
have involved any obligations in the possible case of
mass migrations across frontiers or of attempted mass
migrations.
                 -He wished to revert to that point, because the
Netherlands Government attached very great impor-
tance to the scope of the provision now contained in
article 33.  The Netherlands could not accept any
legal obligations in respect of large groups of refugees
seeking access to its territory.
                 -At the first reading the representatives of Belgium,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands and Sweden had supported the Swiss interpre-
tation.  From conversations he had since had with
other representatives, he had gathered that the
general consensus of opinion was in favour of the
Swiss interpretation.
                 -In order to dispel any possible ambiguity and to
reassure his Government, he wished to have it placed
on record that the Conference was in agreement with
the interpretation that the possibility of mass migra-
tions across frontiers or of attempted mass migrations
was not covered by article 33.
                 -There being no objection, the PRESIDENT ruled
that the interpretation given by the Netherlands
representative should be placed on record.
                 -Mr. HOARE (United Kingdom) remarked that the
Style Committee had considered that the word `return'
was the nearest equivalent in English to the French
term `refoulement'.  He assumed that the word `return'
as used in the English text had no wider meaning.
                 -The PRESIDENT suggested that in accordance
with the practice followed in previous Conventions,
the French word `refoulement' (`refouler' in verbal uses)
should be included in brackets and between inverted
commas after the English word `return' wherever the
latter occurred in the text.- (Emphasis added.)
            Although the significance of the President's comment
that the remarks should be -placed on record- is not
entirely clear, this much cannot be denied: at one time
there was a -general consensus,- and in July of 1951
several delegates understood the right of non-refoulement
to apply only to aliens physically present in the host
country.  There is no record of any later disagreement
with that position.  Moreover, the term -refouler- was
included in the English version of the text to avoid the
expressed concern about an inappropriately broad reading
of the English word -return.-
            Therefore, even if we believed that Executive Order
12807 violated the intent of some signatory states to
protect all aliens, wherever they might be found, from
being transported to potential oppressors, we must ac-
knowledge that other signatory states carefully-and
successfully-sought to avoid just that implication.  The
negotiating history, which suggests that the Convention's
limited reach resulted from a deliberate bargain, is not
dispositive, but it solidly supports our reluctance to
interpret Article 33 to impose obligations on the contract-
ing parties that are broader than the text commands.  We
do not read that text to apply to aliens interdicted on the
high seas.
                                          V
            Respondents contend that the dangers faced by Haitians
who are unwillingly repatriated demonstrate that the
judgment of the Court of Appeals fulfilled the central
purpose of the Convention and the Refugee Act of 1980.
While we must, of course, be guided by the high purpose
of both the treaty and the statute, we are not persuaded
that either one places any limit on the President's author-
ity to repatriate aliens interdicted beyond the territorial
seas of the United States.
            It is perfectly clear that 8 U. S. C. 1182(f), see n. 27,
supra, grants the President ample power to establish a
naval blockade that would simply deny illegal Haitian
migrants the ability to disembark on our shores.  Whether
the President's chosen method of preventing the -attempted
mass migration- of thousands of Haitians-to use the
Dutch delegate's phrase-poses a greater risk of harm to
Haitians who might otherwise face a long and dangerous
return voyage, is irrelevant to the scope of his authority
to take action that neither the Convention nor the statute
clearly prohibits.  As we have already noted, Acts of
Congress normally do not have extraterritorial application
unless such an intent is clearly manifested.  That pre-
sumption has special force when we are construing treaty
and statutory provisions that may involve foreign and
military affairs for which the President has unique
responsibility.  Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936).  We therefore find ourselves
in agreement with the conclusion expressed in Judge
Edwards' concurring opinion in Gracey, 257 U. S. App.
D. C., at 414, 809 F. 2d, at 841:
                 -This case presents a painfully common situation in
which desperate people, convinced that they can no
longer remain in their homeland, take desperate
measures to escape.  Although the human crisis is
compelling, there is no solution to be found in a
judicial remedy.-
            The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

                                                         It is so ordered.